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ABSTRACT
Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac-
quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as-
suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a 
pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the 
varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are 
subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be a conflict 
between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte-
mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge.
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RESUMO
Assumindo uma posição radical em cognição corporificada, de acordo com a qual a infor-
mação adquirida através de processos cognitivos básicos não possui conteúdo (Hutto e 
Myin, 2013), e assumindo que a percepção é uma fonte de conhecimento racionalmente 
fundado (Pritchard, 2012), uma concepção pluralista de conhecimento perceptual é desen-
volvida. Este paper explica (i) como as variedades de conhecimento perceptual são inclusas 
na mesma categoria; (ii) como elas são sujeitas às mesmas restrições normativas; (iii) porque 
não poderia haver um conflito entre as diferentes variedades de conhecimento perceptual; 
e (iv) porque o inquérito epistemológico tradicional tende a superestimar o papel de conhe-
cimento perceptual proposicional.
Palavras-chave: Enativismo radical, conhecimento perceptual, saber-como, saber-que.
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The main claim of embodied views of cognition is that cognition cuts across brain, bodily 
actions and the environment. Hurley (2001), for instance, holds that cognitive processes are hor-
izontally modular in structure and involve internal states, the body and the environment, with 
input and output in feedback loops. On this view, action and perception are constitutive of one 
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another – thus implying an enactive approach to cognition – 
and cognition emerges from a cycle of action-perception-ac-
tion. This implies the rejection of a hierarchy (vertically mod-
ular in structure) from perception to cognition to intentional 
action. Likewise, Noë (2004, 2012) argues that perception is 
constituted by one’s actions in the environment, specifically 
the actions that manifest practical understanding in the ex-
ercise of sensorimotor abilities. A philosophical advantage of 
construing cognition in embodied and enactive terms is the 
resulting phenomenological and epistemological differences 
between genuine perceptual states and deviant states (such as 
hallucinations and illusions). In deviant states, either one is 
not interacting with the environment at all or one’s actions 
are not what would be expected if the circumstances were 
normal – in both cases, one falls short of achieving a percep-
tual state. Embodied cognition, therefore, offers a welcome 
dissolution of an otherwise persistent skeptical anxiety, viz. 
If we were in a radical skeptical scenario, we would entertain 
the same perceptual states as we do in non-skeptical scenarios 
and yet we would fail to access the world. This cannot be so 
according to embodied cognition: brains in vats could not cog-
nize the same way we do.
Despite that advantage, the usual objection leveled 
against embodied views of cognition is that they erroneously 
take mere causal factors (one’s activities in the environment) 
as constitutive of the relevant cognitive processes, which are, 
according to some critics, exclusively brain-bound. As Adams 
and Aziwa (2001, 2010) point out, and as echoed by Prinz 
(2009), to say that bodily actions and the environment are 
causally relevant for a perceptual state is borderline trivial and 
hardly informative, whereas the more contentious claim that 
bodily actions and the environment are constitutive of a per-
ceptual state is unmotivated. For if I am to turn my head to 
the right, I certainly acquire a new perceptual state because I 
moved my head and deployed a set of muscles and part of my 
sensorimotor system in doing so, but this is perfectly contin-
gent in relation to my perceptual content (for someone could 
have shifted my chair). Therefore, my newly acquired percep-
tual state is only causally dependent on my bodily actions in 
this specific environment.
In response, Hutto and Myin (2013) argue that the 
appeal to a distinction between cognitive processes properly 
conceived and merely causal or external features is question 
begging. That strategy, they claim, assumes that there is a 
principled way of distinguishing cognitive processes from 
causally relevant factors, which in turn hinges upon the idea 
that cognition is contentful whereas causal or external events 
are not intrinsically contentful. They propose REC (Radically 
Enactive Cognition), the view that basic minds are content-
less: although some higher mental processes are character-
ized by vehicles carrying contentful information, there is a 
non-empty class of contentless processes which constitute our 
fundamental interactions with the environment. These basic 
processes are explained by one’s actions, and the information 
they convey is explained in terms of the scientifically respect-
able notion of information as covariance. On that account, a 
certain state of affairs carries information about some other 
states of affairs if and only if “the occurrences of these states of 
affairs covary lawfully or reliably enough” (Hutto and Myin, 
2013, p. 66). A more onerous notion of contentful informa-
tion holds that information says something about something else 
– therefore, on the later notion, information has semantic and 
syntactic properties. They write: 
[…] it is important to distinguish the notion 
of information-as-covariance from its richer 
cousin semantic or intentional information 
– the kind of contentful information (the 
message) that some communications con-
vey. […] Call this information-as-content. 
Naturalistic theories with explanatory ambi-
tions cannot simply help themselves to the 
notion of information-as-content, since that 
would be to presuppose rather than explain 
the existence of semantic or contentful 
properties (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 67).
The target of their criticism is the widespread assump-
tion that the ascription of contentful information is neces-
sary for cognition; in other words, that all cognitive acts are 
either representationally or conceptually articulated2. The 
fundamental problem with the views that fall under what 
they call CIC (Cognition (necessarily) Involves Content) 
theories is the challenge of offering a naturalistic explanation 
of contentful basic minds, whereas contentless basic minds 
can be modeled and are philosophically sound3. CIC theories 
with naturalistic constraints, therefore, face the following di-
lemma: they can either give up on the ubiquity of contentful 
information in cognition – thus opening the way to radical 
enactivism – or aim to reduce information-as-content to in-
formation-as-covariance. On this latter horn of the dilemma, 
the proponents of CIC face the Hard Problem of Content, 
for the covariance we find in physical states does not have, by 
itself, semantic and syntactic properties. As Ramsey puts it:
[…] the sort of roles we ordinarily associate 
with representation are not easily cashed 
out in causal-physical terms. When we think 
of representations, we think of things that 
perform tasks like “standing for something 
else” or “informing” or “signifying” and 
such. Yet, it is far from clear just how these 
2 Hutto and Myin also aim at what they call CEC (Conservative Embodied Cognition) theories, according to which cognition necessarily 
involves coupled or action oriented representations that bound an individual to an environment, such as the theories developed by 
Millikan (1995) and Clark (1997).
3 See Chemero (2009) for the discussion of several models of cognition without representations explained by dynamical systems theory.
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sorts of tasks could be implemented in a 
purely physical system (Ramsey, 2015, p. 2).
It follows that, if one opts for a naturalistic explanation 
of cognition that necessarily involves (representational or 
conceptual) content, one ultimately faces an explanatory gap 
between covariance and content. Therefore, the argument 
that cognition is not to be confused with causally relevant 
factors (because it supposedly involves content) does not un-
dermine the embodied stance insofar as that argument only 
assumes, but fails to explain in the naturalistic framework, the 
notion of contentful information.
Contentless knowledge?
If Hutto and Myin’s criticisms are correct, it follows 
that basic cognitive processes such as perception are not in-
trinsically representational or conceptual because they trade 
upon information as covariance. Perception, therefore, is 
not open to the assessment of its accuracy or inaccuracy, its 
truth or falsity, because: “[…] the biologically basic modes of 
organismic responding don’t involve content, where content 
is understood in terms of either reference, truth, or accuracy” 
(Hutto and Myin, 2013, p.  78). And:
A truly radical enactivism – REC – holds that 
it is possible to explain a creature’s capacity 
to perceive, keep track of, and act appropri-
ately with respect to some object or prop-
erty without positing internal structures that 
function to represent, refer to, or stand for 
the object or property in question. Our ba-
sic ways of responding to worldly offerings 
are not semantically contentful (Hutto and 
Myin, 2013, p.  82).
 
Assuming that perceptual experience is a case of con-
tentless basic mind, the following problem arises: how can a 
contentless process generate perceptual knowledge? It seems 
that we cannot have it both ways, because perceptual knowl-
edge is usually taken to be essentially contentful. Clearly. The 
underlying supposition is that perceptual knowledge is con-
ceived exclusively as knowledge-that, but even if we eschew 
this supposition and follow a Rylean line – hence offering a 
non-reductionist account of other forms of perceptual knowl-
edge, such as knowledge-how/where/when – we have to face 
some challenges, viz. explaining (i) why the varieties of per-
ceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) 
whether they are subject to the same kind of normative con-
straints; (iii) whether there could be a conflict between the 
non-propositional and the propositional varieties of percep-
tual knowledge; and (iv) why perceptual knowledge is not the 
way that traditional approaches usually take it to be, namely, 
as abounding propositional knowledge. 
Before attempting to answer these questions in the 
framework of a radically enactive approach, we can briefly 
outline two alternatives that do not sound as appealing: on 
the one hand, we could give up on the idea that basic minds 
are contentless and avoid the burden of explaining contentless 
perceptual knowledge. This, however, would lead us back to 
the objection raised by Prinz, Adams and Akiwa – and, failing 
to meet that challenge, one of the main philosophical gains of 
embodied views of cognition would lose its punch, namely, the 
explanation of the difference between perception and deviant 
states. Moreover, this view would have the additional prob-
lem of explaining (or explaining away) intuitive cases of bona 
fide cognition that do not call for the ascription of content. On 
the other hand, we could retain the ideas that basic minds are 
contentless and that perception is a basic activity, and give up 
on the idea that perception yields perceptual knowledge, but 
this would be a ruthless revisionist approach to epistemology, 
because it would imply skepticism about perceptual knowl-
edge. I find both alternatives unconvincing, so I now turn to 
the challenges mentioned above in order to show that we can 
have contentless basic minds and perceptual knowledge.
Perceptual Knowledge-how/wh 
and Perceptual Knowledge-that
In order to show how the varieties of perceptual knowl-
edge fall under the same category, we need to outline some 
of the conditions for perceptual knowledge-that. Firstly, it is 
uncontentious that knowledge-that is factive, that is, know-
ing that p implies p. Secondly, it is also widely accepted, since 
at least Gettier (1963), that knowledge-that is incompatible 
with luck. Among the epistemologies that aim to meet this re-
quirement, the most successful one is the Safety Theory (Sosa, 
1999; Pritchard, 2005), according to which one knows that 
p iff one could not be easily mistaken about p. The relation 
between the subject and the target proposition is usually con-
strued as a modal one, so that in most or all nearby possible 
worlds in which the subject believes that p, p is true4. Obvious-
ly this is not enough, for there could be nearby possible worlds 
in which one believes falsely that p, but which are irrelevant 
to the assessment of one’s belief in the actual world. One such 
case was described by Pritchard (2005): a subject sees that his 
house is on fire – and plausibly knows that it is – but could 
have easily believed in the false testimony of the village bully 
4 Although this discussion here turns to be about beliefs rather than knowledge, it is also widely accepted that knowledge implies belief, 
in a way that knowledge-that implies a belief which is not true due to luck. This might seem in contrast with another take on knowledge, 
such as the knowledge-first epistemology famously defended by Williamson (2000). What a knowledge-first epistemologist would deny 
is that the concept of knowledge is a complex concept analyzable into simpler ones, such as belief, truth and some further non-circular 
condition – but as Williamson is careful to note, this does not mean that knowledge does not imply belief.
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(in this alternative scenario, his house was not on fire but the 
bully told him so). Clearly, the knowledge acquired by seeing 
that one’s house is on fire is not tarnished by the fact that 
one could easily be mistaken about that. The key here is to 
distinguish the method of belief acquisition in both cases and 
use it in ordering the relevant nearby possible worlds in which 
the subject believes that p. So, one knows that p iff in most or 
all nearby possible worlds in which the subject believes that p 
through the same method, p is true. Finally, there must be direc-
tion of fit from belief to truth (Pritchard, 2009): the individ-
ual must be able to adjust her beliefs in accordance with the 
relevant changes in the world – because we could conceive of 
a scenario where the world is adjusted to fit the beliefs of the 
individual (imagine a benign demon is in control). It seems 
that there would be something epistemically amiss with the 
subject in that case, plausibly because her true beliefs would 
come for free. 
We outlined three aspects of perceptual knowledge-that: 
(i) factivity; (ii) the safety of belief acquisition given a fixed 
method; and (iii) a direction of fit from subject to the world. 
Mutatis mutandis, all these aspects are met by the correct un-
derstanding of the embodied abilities relevant for non-prop-
ositional varieties of perceptual knowledge. (Obviously, the 
need for a propositional attitude is left out in this brief over-
view, for it is the main difference between perceptual knowl-
edge-that and the other forms of perceptual knowledge).
First, the analogue of factivity when we talk about em-
bodied abilities is success in achieving a certain end. One is 
successful in achieving an end E by exercising an ability A if 
the exercise of A is causally relevant for the occurrence of E. 
For example, I am successful in locating a cup of coffee to my 
right by moving my head to the right – my ability in this case, 
moving my head to the right, is causally relevant for achiev-
ing the end of locating it. Obviously, more complex actions 
could be undertaken in a scenario like that, for example, I am 
able to not only locate a cup of coffee, but also pick it up and 
bring it to me. In this latter case we have more steps and more 
modules of my perceptual system are involved in achieving 
the relevant ends. However, in neither case do we need to say 
that the relation between exercising A (or the intermediate 
actions A1,..., An) and achieving E (or E1,..., En) needs to be 
the object of propositional attitudes by the individual in order 
to guarantee success. Both cases are paradigmatic examples 
of knowing where – because I am able to locate the cup in the 
room – but are also cases of knowing when – because I am able 
to track the cup through time – and knowing how – because 
I perceive what kind of actions I am able to perform given 
the information I acquire from the cup, in this environment, 
and my actual bodily configuration and dispositions. In order 
to see the last point, note that, if I had a stiff neck I could be 
unable to turn my head to the right, but I would know how to 
(ceteris paribus) locate the cup by turning my torso around a 
bit more painfully. If my right arm was broken, I would have 
to exercise other parts of my sensory system to pick the cup, 
and so on.
There is some controversy, however, on whether pos-
sessing and exercising an ability in appropriate conditions im-
plies success. Comparing abilities with dispositions, Chemero 
observes that:
The problem with seeing abilities as disposi-
tions is that when coupled with the right en-
abling conditions, dispositions are guaran-
teed to become manifest. The soluble solid 
sugar will always dissolve in water in suit-
able conditions. This is not true of abilities. 
Having the ability to walk does not mean 
that one will not fall down even in the ideal 
conditions for walking. This is to point out 
that there is something inherently norma-
tive about abilities. Individuals with abilities 
are supposed to behave in particular ways, 
and they may fail to do so (2009, p. 145).
Although we do need to recognize the fallible character 
of cognition (in general), we need not locate fallibility between 
a properly exercised ability and the success in achieving a goal. 
If that were the case, the analogy with factivity would seem 
to be compromised, for abilities would not guarantee success. 
Alternatively, we can follow Millar (2011) and claim that in 
appropriate circumstances, the exercise of an ability is guar-
anteed to achieve the desired end. Therefore: “the fallibility 
associated with recognitional abilities consists in not always 
exercising them when we aspire to do so, not in sometimes 
exercising them but failing to come to know” (Millar, 2011, 
p. 334). Although Millar is focusing on conceptual abilities 
and knowing-that, we can capture the gist of his idea in more 
general terms: one can be unsuccessful by failing to properly 
exercise the relevant ability A, not by properly exercising A 
and even so failing to achieve E. This is connected with the 
second condition of perceptual knowledge-that, the meth-
od-related safety: having an ability A on this view means that 
an exercise of A could not easily go wrong (i.e., one could not 
easily fail to exercise A). Just as in Chemero’s view, having the 
ability to walk does not mean one would not fall every once 
in a while, only that one would fall if one fails to exercise the 
abilities involved in walking – hence, there is a behavior one 
is expected to manifest if one possesses an ability. By now it 
should also be clear that abilities themselves are methods for 
achieving specific ends, thus providing a proper analogy with 
method-related safety of belief formation. I could, after all, 
achieve the end of locomotion from X to Y by walking, but 
also by cycling. The fact that I could not achieve that end by 
cycling (imagine I do not know how to cycle) does not mean I 
would not be successful by walking.
The point about direction of fit is more delicate and 
we should take it with a grain of salt. For although there is 
a clear sense in which the particular exercises of the relevant 
abilities and the obtainment of certain ends are due to the 
individual, and to that extent the analogy with perceptual 
knowledge-that holds, things are not so clear on a larger scale. 
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According to radical enactivism, the individual’s actions in 
the environment are constitutive of her cognition, but which 
actions she can perform is determined partly by how the en-
vironment is displayed. This is also the reason why embod-
ied abilities are strongly situated, unlike conceptual abilities, 
which are general and compositional. Moreover, actions cause 
changes in the environment and this in turn changes the set 
of possible actions one can undertake. Consequently, there is 
an interdependence between individual and environment – 
this is why most proponents of embodied cognition take the 
coupling of individual and environment to form a dynamical 
system, a system that changes through time and that can be 
described and predicted by dynamical systems theory with-
out appealing to representational contents. Also, we should 
note that the set of features of the environment that enable 
specific actions given one’s abilities are cognitive niches (Gib-
son, 2015) – but niches are not static. As the interactions 
between individual and environment unfold, cognitive niches 
can be built and arranged in order to better fit the individual’s 
abilities and enable different activities. Therefore, although 
there is an analogy between, on the one hand, the direction of 
fit of the kind of perceptual knowledge acquired by the exer-
cise of embodied abilities and, on the other, the direction of fit 
required for knowledge-that, the mutual influence between 
individual and environment that happens over time could be 
taken as evidence of a profound disanalogy. However, as long 
as we focus on specific exercises of sensorimotor abilities and 
their relation to the non-propositional varieties of perceptual 
knowledge, the analogy is preserved: an individual still has to 
exercise her ability in accordance with what the environment 
offers in order to come to know-how/where/when – there-
fore, non-propositional perceptual knowledge, like perceptu-
al knowledge-that, does not come for free. That is why, on 
the radically enactive approach, we preserve the intuition 
that perceiving is something one does, not something that 
merely happens. 
The normative constraints on 
perceptual knowledge
Can contentless perceptual knowledge be subject to the 
same normative standards as perceptual knowledge-that? We 
started to answer this question by noting that, if one has an 
ability A, there is a way one is supposed to behave, that is, 
one must achieve success by exercising A. Naturally, success 
is a matter of degree: one’s perceptual experience can be im-
proved by one’s actions (conversely, a perceptual experience 
can be worsened if one repeatedly fails to interact with the en-
vironment). This is an important sense in which contentless 
perceptual knowledge is normative: it can be better or worse 
according to what one does. 
A very similar view was offered by Kelly (2010), ac-
cording to which it is a constitutive part of one’s experience 
to act towards its improvement.5 Kelly focuses on the phe-
nomenon of shape constancy, arguing that changes in context 
(say, angle or distance variations between the observer and 
the object) are subject to normative demands. How well one 
perceives a square object, for instance, constitutively depends 
upon one’s actions to get a better view of its squareness. That 
is not the mere empirical claim that we tend to obtain a better 
view of objects by moving around or squinting our eyes. Kelly, 
following Merleau-Ponty, claims that to perceive is (at least 
partially) to be “drawn towards a maximal grip on an object” 
(Kelly, 2010, p. 152). 
There are two important consequences to be drawn 
here. First, if one completely fails to engage with a presented 
object, at the limit, one does not perceive it: “if I am totally 
lost in this respect [on how to improve my experience of the 
scene], therefore, I cannot count as seeing any particular thing 
at all” (Kelly, 2010, p. 152). Secondly, there are no “indifferent” 
perceptual states, such as mental pictures of the environment 
which are neither action-oriented nor action-orienting (or, as 
Kelly puts it, a “neutral Humean image”). If perceptual states 
were indifferent in this sense, then we would be unable to dis-
tinguish between a straightforward view of a trapezoidal ob-
ject and a skewed view of a square object. But we can, mainly 
because our experiences are dynamical and normative: there 
are better and worse ways of perceiving something and we 
enact those ways. 
Kelly does have the right idea when it comes to the 
dynamical character of perceptual experience and its consti-
tutive dependence on our activities according to certain nor-
mative standards. There is, however, something remarkably 
counterintuitive in his proposal, namely: that one’s perceptual 
experience comprehends, at the same level, objects with their 
properties (squares and squareness) and the drive to improve 
one’s experience. If we describe our current experience, we 
certainly find objects and properties, but we do not find that 
drive, for the drive itself is not represented. That might seem 
to suggest that our perceptual experience is static, but this is 
obviously not the point I am making. My point is that we 
should distinguish between different levels of cognition, and 
that description (with objects and properties) is a more so-
phisticated level than contentless cognition. Present tense, 
first-personal description is misleading because it disrupts our 
ongoing engagement and calls for a higher level of attention, 
turning ourselves away from our environment and towards 
our own experience. 
Kelly fails to account for that difference when he claims 
that “every experience of size or shape is not just the percep-
tual representation of a property. Rather, the experience al-
ready invokes a kind of normative self-referentiality” (Kelly, 
2010, p. 149, my emphasis). Obviously, the problem is not 
5 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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with his claim that perceptual experience is normative. The 
problem lies instead in his smuggling of a representational 
(contentful) view, which entails a conflation between basic 
and complex levels of cognition. Consequently, it seems that 
the perception of possibilities of action and the perception of 
objects and properties carry the same epistemic weight. But, 
given that possibilities of action are more fundamental, it is 
clear that we do not see squares and squareness as showing 
up when we move in the same way that we experience possi-
bilities of action. Both levels of cognition, however, are under 
the same normative idea of success. Specifically in the case 
of non-propositional perceptual knowledge, success is to be 
specified in terms of prolific engagement, whereas when it 
comes to perceptual knowledge-that, success is specified in 
terms of factivity.
An alternative approach was recently presented by Noë 
(2015), who claims that concepts are skills of access. Accord-
ing to Noë, in knowing-that perceptually one manifests the 
behavior of successfully accessing the environment in a con-
ceptually articulated manner (also, we should add, by possess-
ing these concepts, one could not easily fail to apply them). 
In connection with the point made above, both factivity and 
success are modes of accessing the environment.
However, we must be careful in following Noë here, for 
his intent is to articulate a pluralist view of concepts, accord-
ing to which not all kinds of concepts are the ones that figure 
in judgments as attributions of properties to individuals and 
are subject to logical constraints. Among the different kinds of 
conceptual understanding, he distinguishes the “perceptual un-
derstanding, or what we might call understanding concepts in the 
perceptual mode” from the “active mode; understanding, that is, 
that can find expression, immediately, in what we do” (Noë, 
2015, p. 3). To exemplify:
The idea that understanding a concept is 
mastery of technique, a mastery that has 
multiple, distinct, context-sensitive ways of 
finding expression, helps here. One way to 
express understanding of [the concept of] 
dog is to talk and write about dogs. Anoth-
er way is to be able to spot dogs on the 
basis of their appearance. Still another is to 
work or play comfortably with dogs. And 
the list goes on and on. We put our singular 
understanding of what dogs are to work in 
these different ways, and the understanding 
consists in the ability to do (more or less) all 
of that (Noë, 2015, p. 11).
As long as we accept that what Noë calls perceptual and 
active modes can be, to a significant degree, contentless skills of 
access, we can accommodate his view, but this in turn gets us 
into a merely verbal dispute. Naturally, the radical enactivist 
eschews the notion that perception and action are necessarily 
conceptually articulated, where concepts are here understood 
as contents with possible logical relations among themselves. 
But the radically enactive approach is clearly consistent with 
the notion of “Noë-concepts” as skills of access. I recommend 
that we stick to the traditional view on concepts in order to 
avoid confusion. Moreover, we construed the notions of 
knowing-where and knowing-when as abilities to locate and 
track things in an environment and, more importantly, of 
knowing-how as an ability to perform certain actions in accor-
dance with environmental features. We therefore gave a pre-
cise sense to the idea of skills of access which is independent of 
talk about concepts in general and Noë-concepts in particular. 
Now, still on this topic of normativity, the radical en-
activist also appears to pose a problem to those who take 
perception to be a source of rationally grounded knowledge. 
A traditional view holds that rationality operates (a) in pat-
terns of reasoning, which are reflexively accessible, and (b) 
in certain subpersonal cognitive modules, that is, structures 
that process information through the manipulation of rep-
resentations and rules in order to make such information 
available to further uses by the system. As an example of the 
latter, consider Marr’s theory of vision (1982). According to 
Marr, three-dimensional visual perception is the outcome 
of a series of subpersonal steps consisting in the application 
of rules that enrich the raw stimulus received on the retina. 
Retinal stimulation is, on Marr’s account, just crude electro-
magnetic energy, so it is poor and ambiguous – by itself, it is 
insufficient to discriminate between objects, distances, shapes, 
etc. The brain then processes the received stimuli by applying 
certain rules to it. It is tempting to take the processes involved 
in transforming raw retinal stimulation into visual perception 
as patterns of reasoning, for just like inferences, they involve 
rules and representations. These processes, however, are not 
accessible from the first-person point of view, so one cannot 
control them – therefore, they are not strictly analogous to 
inferences. By any means, rationality is traditionally taken to 
be manifested in truth conductive or probabilistic processes 
which are essentially contentful. A contradiction looms. 
Radically embodied views of cognition must make room 
for an alternative account of rationality, one that is inclusive 
enough to allow us to identify epistemic norms in the way an 
organism interacts with the environment through the exer-
cise of its abilities. These abilities are broadly of two kinds: (i) 
ontogenetic abilities, i.e., abilities developed during the organ-
ism’s individual history, which include the abilities to perform 
specific cognitive tasks and to manipulate tools, as well as the 
problem-solving skills one learns and refines in the course of 
one’s life; and (ii) the abilities that have older phylogenetic 
roots, such as hard-wired abilities selected by evolution, which 
must be in place for the development of ontogenetic abilities. 
Clearly, reasoning is a very specific ability that some animals 
are able to perform, with a success rate varying between indi-
viduals of the same species and between different species as 
well – but there seems to be no independent reason to suppose 
that reasoning must be the only form of ability that is constitu-
tive of rationality. If we opt for a broader conception of ratio-
nality, we can accommodate without contradiction the ideas 
that perception is usually a contentless process and that it is 
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rationally grounded, for it is the outcome of certain abilities, 
viz., sensorimotor abilities that enable one’s successful, prolific 
engagement in an environment. Here is Hurley on the matter:
Rationality reconceived in horizontally mod-
ular terms is substantively related to the 
environment. It does not depend only on 
internal procedures that mediate between 
input and output […]. Rather, it depends on 
complex relationships between dedicated, 
world-involving layers that monitor and re-
spond to specific aspects of the natural and 
social environment and of the neural net-
work, and register feedback from responses 
(2001, p. 10).
Therefore, combining a minimal internalism, accord-
ing to which perception is a source of rationally grounded 
knowledge, with an embodied view of cognition is acceptable 
insofar as we do not equate rationality with the ability to 
perform inferences. Finally – and this relates to the point 
mentioned in §3 about niche building – rationality so con-
ceived is directly correlated with the kind of changes we pro-
mote in our environment, changes that enable us to thrive. 
The more rational an organism is, the more successful it is 
in adapting and dealing with different circumstances that 
call for adjustments and refinements of its abilities and the 
development of new ones. Plausibly, mutatis mutandis, the 
same can be said about species and the development of phy-
logenetic abilities. Therefore, if a desideratum for any view 
about rationality is that humans in general are more rational 
than other animals (thus assuming a variation of degree), 
the radically enactive view clearly satisfies it. 
From perceiving to 
perceiving that
The analogy between the varieties of perceptual knowl-
edge and the shared normative constraints makes it easy to 
answer whether different varieties of perceptual knowledge 
could be in conflict. Consider the particular cases an individ-
ual could be in: (i) she successfully achieves an end through 
the exercise of her sensorimotor abilities, say, tracking an 
approaching object by fixing her gaze and adjusting her posi-
tion, and perceives that the object is approaching her; (ii) she 
successfully achieves the end of locating the approaching ob-
ject, but fails to perceive that the object is approaching; (iii) 
she fails to exercise her sensorimotor abilities, but perceives 
that the object is approaching; (iv) she successfully exercises 
her sensorimotor abilities and locates the approaching ob-
ject, but she perceives that it is not an approaching object; 
finally, (v) she fails to locate the object and to perceive that 
it is approaching.
Case (i) is clearly a case of harmony, while case (v) ex-
hibits a lack of perceptual knowledge altogether. Now, assum-
ing that the radically enactive approach makes it possible to 
understand certain cases of cognitive achievement as basic, 
thereby being essential for more complex cases of cognition 
without necessitating them, it is clear that (ii) is not a conflict-
ing case. Indeed, (ii) is similar to most of our interactions with 
the environment. By the same token, it follows that (iii) is not 
possible, at least not in normal cases of cognition.6 Finally, it 
seems that case (iv) would represent the only genuine case of 
conflict. But by factivity and its analogue of success, (iv) is also 
not possible: it would rather represent a failure of accessing 
the environment, either at the non-propositional level or at 
the contentful level. In each situation, therefore, it would not 
be a conflict between the different varieties of knowledge, but 
either a case of failing to achieve non-propositional perceptu-
al knowledge (thus reducing (iv) to (v)) or a case of failing to 
achieve perceptual knowledge-that (thus reducing (iv) to (ii)).
Although cases where there is a harmony between dif-
ferent varieties of perceptual knowledge, like (i) above, seem 
to be less exciting, they also raise interesting points. First, 
there is some leeway between the act of perceiving an object 
and articulating the perceived event in a propositional fashion. 
Imagine again someone locating and tracking an approaching 
object. One can just dodge the object. But one could also per-
ceive that it is a tennis ball that went by, or that it is a tennis ball 
from the other court – and one could also (albeit unusually) 
perceive that it is a Wilson tennis ball, etc. 
The second point concerns how one can go from 
non-propositional to propositional perceptual knowledge. 
One way to explore this transition is by what I call “disruptive 
occasions”. Disruptive occasions are challenges that demand 
a higher level of attention in order to complete a task which, 
in their absence, could be successfully done without raising 
or shifting one’s attention. Conversational challenges to per-
ceptual knowledge readily come to mind: imagine I am at my 
office and I have a lot of stuff scattered around on my table. I 
can navigate through it just fine, grab a cup of coffee over there 
and pick up my kindle amidst the books without even looking, 
etc. But if someone asks me whether the coffee is to the right 
of the kindle, or at the same level as the books, I would have 
to pay attention to what I usually do inattentively in order to 
come to know it perceptually in a contentful manner.
Two further things about disruptive occasions must be 
noted. First, that conversational challenges are not the default 
in our everyday life, we simply do not face challenges to our 
perceptual knowledge very often. Second, that not all dis-
6 One could argue that (iii) is possible, as manifested in cases of akinetopsia, where individuals are unable to perceive motion. But even 
so, in cases like this, one would not perceive that the object is approaching, rather one would perceive that there is an object o at time 
t in position p, and then that o is at t1 at p1 and so on. That o is approaching the observer would be the result of an inference, not a 
content of perceptual knowledge.
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ruptive occasions are conversational, there could be changes 
in the environment that would call for different actions and 
abilities. Imagine, for instance, that I successfully engage in 
the activity of writing a paper on my notebook. All goes well 
until I have to continue my work on a different computer 
(say, at the library) with a different keyboard design. After 
some mistakes I have to adapt and pay more attention when 
typing so I can know precisely where certain keys are. In this 
case, the view I’m advancing here says that, in the first stage, 
I’m perceiving my keyboard because I manifest a competent 
engagement with it, I know how to use it – for instance, how 
much pressure I have to put on the space bar for it to work – 
and where the keys are (I also know when they are, but there is 
no relevant temporal variation in this example). The change 
of keyboards is a disruptive occasion that calls for a different 
attitude: the same finger movements I’m used to performing 
while typing are not as successful as before because they do 
not produce the desired results. Certain changes in the en-
vironment, therefore, are disruptive occasions because they 
demand different activities and, at a limit, the performance 
of entirely different abilities in order to achieve the desired re-
sult. We could imagine an example where the new keyboard 
on which I have to type uses another alphabet, so I have to 
translate the keys. I would then perform a completely differ-
ent activity than simply typing. In order to do this, at least at 
the beginning, I would have to know that this key stands for 
a specific letter by looking at it. In this case, knowing how to 
type simply is not enough to guarantee success, but I would 
still need to be able to locate and track the keys in order to 
type properly.
As we mentioned, there is a clear relation between 
knowing-that and attention, as it is plausibly assumed that 
knowing that something is the case demands paying attention 
to features of the environment that one would not usually no-
tice. This can be taken to be one of the morals of the discussion 
about speckled hens, where one perceives a speckled hen, but, 
due to lack of attention, does not perceive the precise number 
of speckles it has. One does not know that the hen has a certain 
amount of speckles. This is compatible with our explanation 
of the transition from non-propositional to propositional 
perceptual knowledge: when one is engaged with the environ-
ment without paying attention to one’s own actions and the 
achievement of the relevant ends, the available information is 
being accessed and managed by one’s sensorimotor abilities. 
When a disruptive occasion occurs, attention is called for to 
modulate the flow of information in a contentful manner. 
How exactly this occurs is an empirical matter (and explain-
ing it depends largely on a precise account of representational 
content), and while there is one hypothesis available – that 
the flow of information is modulated into working memory, 
which is a rule-driven process (Clark, 2009) – we do not need 
to subscribe to any hypothesis at this juncture. The important 
thing here is that the function of attention is not merely to 
narrow the focus of an ongoing process, but to change it alto-
gether by adding content.7 
It is important to note that the threshold of attention 
changes from person to person, according to one’s background 
knowledge and expertise. For instance, imagine a boxer per-
forming a complex series of exercises with a punching ball, 
which is fixed to a board parallel to the ground and moves 
like a pendulum in many different directions. Imagine that 
the boxer has to punch the ball twice with her right hand in 
two different directions and twice with her left hand in two 
different directions, occasionally adding more punches to each 
hand. An experienced boxer would be able to easily locate the 
ball during its trajectory in accordance with the strength she 
uses, the point where she hits it at a certain angle and the time 
at which she hits it with each hand. This exercise can be suc-
cessfully performed without any effort in identifying the rele-
vant variables. However, something like a very unpredictable 
behavior by the ball would call for a higher level of attention, 
e.g., if it suddenly loses some air, but not enough to become 
entirely flat. A disruptive occasion like that would prevent the 
experienced boxer from successfully attaining the relevant 
goal effortlessly, and, at least initially, would demand of her 
that she knows that the ball, being at a certain position after 
being hit with that much strength, and so on, would go this 
way or that. The story is completely different if we imagine 
a novice trying to do the same exercise. If one lacks the mus-
cular memory that enables a quasi-automated performance, 
it is crucial to pay attention in identifying the relevant vari-
ables, and that can only be done by consciously following a 
rule more or less like “you have to hit here, at this angle, when 
the ball is right here, with this much strength, so it…”. For the 
novice, the threshold of attention is lower than for the expert, 
and basically every movement of the ball demands attention 
to perform the next step. Note, moreover, that in order to 
achieve this knowledge-that, she still has to adjust her body in 
exercising her abilities and pay attention to her causal interac-
tions with the environment. That explains why perceptually 
knowing-that is a more complex attitude, in the sense that it 
is dependent upon non-propositional varieties of perceptual 
knowledge. We need to highlight that, when one is engaged 
in an activity, without conscious thoughts, motives or plans 
about what one is doing and what one must do, the activity 
still qualifies as cognitive and is open to evaluation. 
7 Dreyfus’s readings of Heidegger seem to contain a very similar view. For instance, Dreyfus (1991) argues that there is no real distance 
between individuals in non-disruptive occasions (or as he calls it, in absorbed coping) and the world. In one out of the many ways of 
exploring this position, Dreyfus takes absorbed coping to be entirely nonminded, for “expert coping [is] direct and unreflective” and 
this is the “same as nonconceptual and nonminded” (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 355), which thus explains why individuals are not distanced from 
the environment. This would mark a difference between our accounts, for I take engagement in non-disruptive occasions to be minded 
but not contentful.
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Against tradition?
The radical enactivist denies that cognition necessarily 
involves content, and we advanced this position by appeal to 
embodied abilities that one could not easily fail to exercise. This 
means that perceptual knowledge is primarily non-proposi-
tional, so our view does oppose a tradition that takes proposi-
tional perceptual knowledge to be the only kind of perceptual 
knowledge, or at least the only kind relevant to epistemology. 
That is, of course, wrong, but we should ask ourselves why 
perceptual knowledge-that has received too much emphasis. 
By doing so, we can grant that some inquiries into the nature 
of knowledge-that are accurate – we indeed relied on them 
when highlighting the shared aspects of the different varieties 
of perceptual knowledge – even as they fail to acknowledge that 
perceptual knowledge-that is not a case of basic cognition. 
Epistemologists tend to suppose that the scope of knowl-
edge-that is broader than it actually is because of a Cartesian 
methodological inheritance. Let us unravel that: just like in 
Descartes’s Meditations, epistemologists traditionally begin 
their inquiries into the nature of knowledge by imagining a 
setting which is both artificial and static, in which an indi-
vidual, away from the hassle of everyday life, is in a certain 
epistemological relation with a given object. This choice of set-
ting is methodological because it is intended to clear the noise 
produced by non-cognitive relations between the individual 
and her environment. But it ends up clearing away more 
than that. Of course, since at least Gettier, the dialectics of 
epistemological inquiries consisted basically in presenting an 
intuitive theory that covers paradigmatic cases, describing the 
epistemic principles underlying the theory, submitting them 
to counterexamples, adjusting the theory, testing it with new 
counterexamples and so on. But one can still find examples 
with an aura of the traditional approach in post-Gettier liter-
ature. Here is an example of a case described in a very artifi-
cial and static way, thus ignoring the role played by action in 
perception. I apologize in advance for the painfully long quote:
You are undergoing an operation for an an-
eurysm in your occipital lobe. The surgeon 
wants feedback during the operation as to 
the effects of the procedure on the func-
tioning of your visual cortex. He reduces all 
significant discomfort with local anaesthetic 
while he opens your skull. He then darkens 
the operating theater, takes off your blind-
fold, and applies electrical stimulation to a 
well-chosen point on your visual cortex. As a 
result, you hallucinate dimly illuminated spot-
lights in a ceiling. (You hallucinate lights on in 
a ceiling. As yet, you are not at all aware of 
the lights or the ceiling of the operating the-
ater.) As it happens, there really are spotlights 
in the ceiling at precisely the places where 
you hallucinate lights. However, these real 
lights are turned off, so that the operating 
theater is too dark to really see anything. […] 
[The surgeon] turns on the spotlights in the 
ceiling, leaving them dim enough so that 
you notice no difference. You are now hav-
ing what some call a “veridical hallucina-
tion”. You are still having a hallucination for 
you are not yet seeing the lights on in the 
ceiling […] Yet your hallucination is veridical 
or in a certain way true to the scene before 
you; there are indeed dim lights on in a ceil-
ing in front of you.
In the third stage of the experiment the 
surgeon stops stimulating your brain. You 
now genuinely see the dimly lit spotlights in 
the ceiling. From your vantage point there 
on the operating table these dim lights are 
indistinguishable from the dim lights you 
were hallucinating (Johnston, 2004, p. 122).
Johnston’s point here is to provide support to the prem-
ise of the argument from hallucination, according to which 
hallucinatory episodes enjoy the same epistemic qualities as 
genuine perceptual states. Therefore, according to Johnston, 
perception and hallucination are not epistemically different 
in fundamental aspects. Although there are other ways to 
counter his argument (for instance, see Neta, 2008), we can 
go so far as to grant him the truth of the following conditional: 
in such conditions, perception and hallucination are very much 
alike. But no argument has been provided to show that these 
conditions are sufficiently similar to everyday interactions 
with our environment, in which our actions are not so tightly 
constrained. In particular, the ingenuity of the setting invites 
us to think that it is a very unique kind of case, a case in which 
someone is perceiving lights in the ceiling statically, unable to 
exercise her perceptual abilities correctly. The patient cannot 
move her head in order to distinguish the hallucination of 
lights (which would plausibly follow her movements) from 
the actual presence of the lights (which would stay fixed at 
certain points). If she could do so, on the other hand, and the 
surgeon were to keep track of her movements and generate 
new hallucinations in order to guarantee that her putative 
perceptual states were indeed hallucinatory, then this new 
scenario would not be much different from a traditional 
skeptical one, where mistakes are inevitable. It seems that 
Johnston’s case can only work if we suppose that action is in-
essential to a full blown perceptual state. That, I think, points 
precisely in the opposite direction of what Johnston intends: 
a perceptual state deprived of action is impoverished, and it 
could be very much like a veridical hallucination. It is hard 
to see, however, what a case like that shows about perceptual 
states more generally.
Concluding remarks
I intended to offer a philosophically sound account of 
perceptual knowledge as a case of contentless basic mind, viz., 
an account of perception in terms of the exercise of embodied 
Giovanni Rolla
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(1): 47-56, jan/apr 2017 56
abilities. The non-propositional varieties of perceptual knowl-
edge share aspects and normative constraints with perceptu-
al knowledge-that, thus explaining why they fall within the 
same broader category of perceptual knowledge. There are 
further questions for the view advanced here: what about 
cases in which an individual is systematically prevented from 
exercising her abilities, such as skeptical scenarios? In these 
cases, one not only fails to know, but fails to be rational. Is this 
really counterintuitive? Is this consequence acceptable? These 
are questions for the future.
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